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00:00:00 	 Pasi: When we last left off, you were talking about how you were-you brought 
together people from all of the technical disciplines and you know maybe you 
could continue discussing that. 
00:00:15 	 Rail: These are multi -agency review teams for each one of the technical 
disciplines and they were handpicked people. We picked them because one, they 
were good; two they would be around long enough to go through the entire 
development process; three they were not enemies of the program; they didn't 
have to be supporters, but at least they were not enemies of the program and they 
were going to be available to help us when we asked them to. 
We encouraged direct communication between the engineers and the 
contractors-face to face, meeting to meeting, open and above board, no games, 
no nothing absolutely. We traveled back and forth to wherever it was that was 
important and we made sure that the independent review teams that we had 
operated the same way. They were a great help to us in keeping outside 
influences interfering with the program. They contributed in some regards and I 
think are an important part to a successful program. 
They-another interesting and important aspect in my engineering team in the F­
15 was that we kept the group lean. And that is so that everybody was fully 
occupied, if not a hundred and ten percent occupied, and that they could identify 
personally with the success or failure of the program. There was no question 
about that. They were good; they were also handpicked and they had the sole 
motivation to provide the best program that was possible to build at the time. 
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Let's see. Another aspect of it was that you do not want to start configuration 
control of the program too early, in fact not until the preliminary design review 
comes about. The configuration control people would like to begin it from the 
time of contract reward, but that's way to early and all you do is get bogged down 
in paperwork going back and forth across each other's desk. 
Pasi: Now for a layman, what is "configuration control?" 
Rail: Well in order to introduce discipline into the design process, it is mandatory 
that once a configuration of a part is established that there be a complete track 
record of any changes that are made to that part, no matter how small it is. [It] 
doesn't make any difference. You need that in order to order spare parts. You 
need that in order to do maintenance. You need that to build up the maintenance 
manuals that are required by the Using Command and the Maintaining Command. 
It's an important function, but it's a function that shouldn't be started before the 
Preliminary Design Review. 
After the Preliminary Design Review when parts of the program are ready to be 
put down on paper finally, then a separate problem exists, and that is to make sure 
that any changes which come about don't occupy a large amount of paperwork. 
In order to avoid that paperwork I had a requirement that said if a contractor was 
proposing a change, that it was necessary for the contractor to talk together with 
his counterpart engineer in my organization; work out any differences that they 
had, any disagreements-If there were any disagreements to come up and get 
them up to my level so we could make a decision. 
And then once there was agreement between the engineering and the SPO, and 
engineering and the contractor's plant, to have the contractor send in the TWX 
through my office. I would hand it out to the appropriate engineer for final 
review; back up to my office for final ok and then back out. That way we cut 
down on the paperwork which is just absolutely devastating if you go through the 
normal "send in the change, ask what it's all about, don't like it, send back, I think 
we ought to do it this way." And the paperwork goes back and forth. 
Pasi: Endless 
Rail: Yeah, it absolutely is. I mean and it'sjust wasteful, waste [of] engineering 
talent. 
Pasi: Would you say then that essentially your approach was just maybe opening 
up more channels of communication, involving the right people, and as you said 
"keeping it lean and-" 
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Rall: Absolutely, absolutely, and-but-make sure that the foundation was good. 
I mean the fundamental is the foundation. I mentioned earlier that we had to get 
agreement on what the objectives were. I'll give you as an example: the F-15 
program had a set of requirements at various mach numbers and altitude for what 
were called Ps, specific excess power. Really it's a fancy name for instantaneous 
rate ofclimb. And the idea-this is before we had an engine and I'll get back to 
that later-but the idea was to have a sort of a balance between the requirements 
at all of the Mach numbers and altitudes so that not one was particularly driving, 
but that it was a well-balanced approach. 
Well when I looked at it, it turned out that the one at Mach two was ridiculously 
high and you could forget about all of the other Mach numbers and altitudes. All 
you had to do was look at the Mach two one and that sized the engine and that 
sized the airplane. I said "that's ridiculous." So I adjusted the Mach two number 
down in the Request for Proposal paper work. I did that one day; the next day I 
had two TAC generals, Tactical Air Command, sitting at my desk the next 
morning asking me "how come I was screwing up their airplane [laughs] by 
reducing the requirement at Mach two. I went through it and I explained it to 
them and they said "what they were really interested in was the acceleration from 
Mach 1.6 up to Mach 2.0" and that once they understood what I was doing and 
why I was doing it, and that that acceleration wasn't affected, that they were 
supportive. [Laughs] 
But it shows the kind of sensitivity that exists when you set that foundation. I 
mean you cannot emphasize that foundation too much. The other thing is to have 
a set of those technical milestones are critically important and you have to have a 
team which is responsive. We had one milestone that said we had to pass the 
ultimate static test on the wing by such and such a date. 
Pasi: Now is this on the F-15? 
Rall: On the F-15. And we conducted that test and we broke the wing at 
something like-I forget the exact number something-like one hundred and 
thirty-seven percent. And we were supposed to be able to go to a hundred and 
fifty percent. I got a call in the four o'clock in the morning from one of my 
structures engineers-six foot four, two hundred and eighty pound, strong, 
wrestling looking guy-practically in tears saying we had "broke the wing." Well 
I said "that's the way it goes c'mon back and we'll see what we can do." Well the 
next day we looked at it and got the analysis and said it was a sort of a common 
column buckling problem, all we had to do was increase the web thickness and 
we were able to do it. Within less than a month we ran the test and passed it 
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successfully. I mean I've been in programs where it would have taken you six 
years to get agreement just to what it was that you were going to do. The other 
thing that's really important is not to stretch the program out. Any time you 
change administrations-any time you change the military commanders-you are 
likely to get a hiccup in the programs because they'll have different ideas of what 
ought to be done. 
00:10:04 	 Pasi: At all levels 
00:10:05 	 Rall: At all levels, doesn't make any difference what level they're at. They all 
want to have their own imprint on it. The F-15 Program Director, Major-he was 
originally a Brigadier General that ended up a Major General, and then finally a 
Lieutenant General-what he did when he took over the F-15 SPO was to 
establish a "blue-line" management perspective. 
Bellis had been head of the SR-71 so he came from a "black" world experience 
where you didn't have a lot of these management people looking over your 
shoulder and second guessing as to what you wanted to do. So he got agreement 
with the head of Systems Command and the head-the Chief of Staff of the Air 
Force-that he would bypass the normal chain of command and report only to 
Systems Command Headquarters and to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and 
the Secretary of the Air Force. That made lots of people mad because now they 
were being eliminated from a very important program, the most important 
program that the Air Force had going. 
When the F-15 program started we felt that it was important to establish the 
credibility of the Air Force as an acquisition organization. Prior to the F-15 
program we had bought Navy A-7s. We had bought Navy A-3Ds which we called 
the B-66. We had bought Navy F-4s. We had bought English B-57s. We had 
gone through the C-5A development here in which the management people had 
said "well the way to keep the cost under control is all we have to do is 
incentivize the weight on the airplane and therefore since weight equal cost, 
that'll guarantee that we get a good program. And of course what happened was 
they took the weight out of the airplane and so it failed a fatigue test, [laughs] and 
we had to go back and change the design-and a major, major, hiccup in the 
program. The F-111 came along and I've already gone through the disaster of 
what the F -111 went though. So the track record of acquisition here at Wright 
Field was less than stellar. 
And so the F -15 carried the mantle of establishing credibility again. And so I 
think that made it possible to establish the "blue-line" management technique that 
General Bellis came up with. But there were disadvantages that would come up 
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eventually along the way. I remember one in which we had an engine failure. Ah 
back up back up, back up, Fred. The F -15 program was unique in that it 
developed its own engine for the airplane. Ordinarily engines are provided GFE, 
Government Furnished Equipment, where there's a separate contract with the 
engine by a different organization and that's supplied to the airframe people. 
Because the engine development time takes longer than the airplane development 
time we started the engine development probably six months before the airplane. 
That engine-
Pasi: Is this what would become the F-100 
Rall: That's the F -100 engine right. In that process there was great pressure to 
decide what the size of that engine was going to be. And as I indicated earlier 
there were lots of decisions that had to be made before you could say what the 
size of the engine ought to be before we even had proposals from the airframe 
contractors. 
Well finally after I got the agreement that the Mach 2 instantaneous rate of climb 
level, it became obvious that that was the time to make a decision as to what the 
size of the engine was so I said two hundred and twenty pounds per second air 
flow, and that was it. And that went forward. That's an illustration of you want 
to make the decision at the right time-not too early not too late-you don't want 
to procrastinate when decisions have to be made. And that engine program was 
quite successful until we were running I think it was a preliminary flight reading 
test, and it was at the high Mach number, and I forget the exact Mach number, but 
it was probably close to-it was either two point three or two point five Mach 
number and we had an engine failure. And all of the people who had been 
bypassed in the ordinary management chains said "ah my god we've got them this 
time." So they said-they-headquarters people demanded we come up there and 
explain that to them. Well it turned out that Bellis was out visiting in Colorado 
Springs that day and I think there was something with his son; I don't remember 
what the family details were. But that night we were called down to General 
Stewart's office, who was commander at ASD, at seven o'clock at night, and we 
were told we had to put this briefing together and go up to Washington, and brief 
the Secretary and his people about what this engine failure was and how are you 
going to do things. 
Pasi: Secretary of the Air Force. 
Rall: Secretary of the Air Force. So we sat down that night; I went home about 
eight o'clock; the rest of my people started putting the paper together. I got up at 
four o'clock and got to the base at five o'clock, and hopped on a T-39 and flew 
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into the Pentagon, and I reviewed the briefing and then put it together on the way 
there. It turns out that there was a-when I got to the briefing there-was a three­
star general there who had been particularly antagonistic with Bellis [laughs] 
during that time period about his management style and things and I mean really 
teed off. I mean we really had a hard time in that briefing and that briefing was a 
good briefing. 	 We got commended by the commander as far as the quality of the 
briefing was concerned, but it was clear that there was going to be some internal 
fighting up at the Pentagon level about what we were going to do on that thing 
about fixing that problem. 
It's one of those problems which shouldn't be a problem at all because 
independent of the fact that the airplane can go to Mach two point five, it uses up 
all the fuel by the time it get there so it can't do anything. So it's strictly an 
academic exercise to get the engine to really function well up there. But that's the 
way it goes and you've got to take your lumps. So we sat down and changed the 
compressor and got it to run and ran it-a little later than we wanted it to but 
that's ok. 
00:18:19 	 Pasi: Now that engine was eventually used in the F-16 too. Is that right? 
00:18:22 	 The F-16-was also-yep-used in that airplane. It had some problems throwing 
compressor blades later on. And there's always been a sort of hidden requirement 
that you have two engine contractors. When I started in the business there was a 
multitude of engine contractors. There was Westinghouse that was building 
engines. General Electric was building engines. Curtis-Wright was building 
engines. Allison was building engines. Pratt & Whitney was building engines 
and eventually each [laughs] one of those companies would fold up and go away, 
and disappear. So we're left with only two engine contractors, Pratt & Whitney 
and General Electric. And so in order to keep them going they liked to share the 
business and so eventually the F-100 engine in the F-16 was replaced with the 
General Electric engine. But I mean that's just sort of a business decision that's 
made at higher levels. [Laughs] 
I got to digress and back up a little bit. I got lots of lessons along the way. One 
lesson was that Curtis-Wright was building the J-67 engine which was supposed 
to be the major airplane-major engine to go in Mach 2 airplanes. And a lot of 
airplanes were counting on that coming along. And the Aircraft Laboratory 
civilian chief wanted me to go out to Curtis-Wright and brief the company about 
engine inlet compatibility because of the F-101 problems and the like. So I did 
that; I went out there and I talked to them for a day all about the problems that­
what-! knew etcetera, and they all nodded their heads and listened to me very 
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graciously. And at the end of the day the chief engineer invited me into his office 
and we sat down and had a long conversation. And he said he really appreciated 
what I had done and coming out there. He said "but Fred," he said "the problem 
is we can't get the engine to run at all much less worry about compatibility." 
[Laughs] "And that's the truth," he said, "that's the truth." I mean after that I 
didn't worry about the J-67 engine because it never made it out of test. [Laughs] 
A lot of good engine stories. Let's see now I have to back up to where I was. We 
fixed the F-100 engine and got it running; we did pay a penalty because we had 
created that "blue-line" management system, or Bellis had, because we made so 
many enemies along the way. But that's the-you got to pay some prices. 
Pasi: Ifwe can maybe take a chance to transition for a moment. 
Rall: Sure 
Pasi: You talked about-Ithink you were discussing-the SR-71 and you 
mentioned about keeping your nose to the grindstone and focusing on the task at 
hand, and just doing your work. Ifwe can maybe talk about the broader culture at 
large Mr. Rall. It was a time of the Cold War and I guess I'd like to know was the 
Cold War something that you thought about? Was it something that manifested 
itself in your; were you cognizant of this, or was it something that really didn't 
manifest itself. 
Rall: Oh it was-we were cognizant of it all the time. If we were working on a 
fighter, the fighters we were up against were the Soviet Union fighters. When I 
was working in the Aircraft Laboratory, after a May Day parade I would get 
called up to come over to the Foreign Technology Division at the base and review 
the photographs that they had of the new airplanes. 
You can tell from the inlet design ramp angles, cone angles, geometry, what the 
design Mach number of the airplane is. You can look at the exhaust nozzle and 
tell a lot about what the configuration is. And it was clear that-I mean-I wasn't 
doing this because this was just of general interest; this was really important 
information. I got reviewed-called up to review, ah I'll say "foreign assets" to 
evaluate what their capabilities were going to be. When we did a bomber the 
bomber's targets were always against the Soviet Union, survivability was the 
thing you had to worry about then. The electronic counter-measures were always 
against the Soviet threat, the Soviet threat because they were the toughest enemy 
to beat. We were up against MiG-2ls in Korea, in Vietnam; we were up against 
the MiG-15s in Korea. This conflict, this Cold War conflict was always there; 
was always present. 
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I [laughs] should say I don't think I mentioned it but I was project officer on some 
mutual weapons defense exchange agreements. I had exchange agreements with 
France, Germany, and Australia, and I did consulting with Sweden on their 
Viggen airplane. The foreigners were worried about the thing; I mean their view 
about the Soviet Union was a lot more concerned than I was being thousands of 
thousands of miles away from them. They were really worried. 
Pasi: In Western Europe. 
Rall: In Western Europe, absolutely. I gave an AGARD briefing one time. I 
don't remember what AGARD stands for, some kind of research and development 
organization, technical organization. It was in Gottingen, Germany and I was 
riding a train from France up to Gottingen. And out the window was this barbed 
wire fence with all these pillars with machine guns manned by soviet guys driving 
by. I mean it was no question about what [laughs] we were up against. 
Pasi: It was a realistic threat. 
Rall: Oh absolutely was. No question. 
Pasi: Did any of the systems ever change because of maybe looking at May Day 
pictures or any perceived Soviet threats or were they always light years behind us 
in technology? 
Rall: Well they tended to want to catch up to us. The "Fox Bat" airplane was a 
counter to the expected threat from the B-70 bomber. They tended to follow us 
after we got there. Electronic counter measures-this is where you do jamming, 
fooling-the electronics would always be driven by what the perceived threat is. 
You have aircraft equipped to receive signals from the Soviets. You know you 
fly close to them. You find what kind of radars they're using. What kind of 
communications system they're using. You tap into their communication systems 
all the time and that information is fed directly into the development systems so 
that you can counter any perceived threat. Their flight testing is reviewed from 
satellite photos; you can see what kinds of things that they're doing so you can 
tell whether or not you're far enough ahead that you ought to keep on going or 
change things. 
Pasi: Was there ever something you saw that the Soviets might have been ahead 
of us in as far as systems or aircraft technology. 
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Pasi: Sure 
Rall: [Laughs] I don't know. 
Pasi: At least not in engine development. inlets and things 
Rall: No, no. 
Pasi: And it's fine if you can't 
Rall: No I would say, and here's a point. Stealth- [laughs] some of the best 
original work in stealth was done by Russian mathematicians, physicists-kind of 
people. And we used that as research, the material by us-the theoretical 
calculations-very good work. [Laughs] They're the ones that started it. I'd like 
to mention as an aside; most people think that stealth, low radar signatures, low 
infrared signatures, begun just in the recent past. In 1959, which is almost sixty 
years ago, there was a classified program called Project Visa in which they put 
radar attenuating material on the T-33. [Laughs] Not many people in this world 
know about that. 
Pasi: So that was an early attempt at invisibility? 
Rall: At reducing the radar signature so as to increase survivability. Yeah. 
Pasi: You bring up stealth-as far as the Cold War is concerned 1945 to the early 
1990s, obviously your experience is in internal aerodynamics-oh I'm sorry, go 
ahead. 
Rall: The U-2 was shot down with Gary Powers over Russia, which said that the 
Russians had more capability in their missile capability than what we expected. 
The SR-71 's shape, what are called "chines," the sort of flared parts go along the 
side of the body, are in part response to that threat of radar detection, in that they 
deflect the radar signal away from the receiver of the Russians, which is another 
reason the SR-71 was chosen instead of the B-70. 
The new stealth programs are always aimed at what the Russian electronic 
capability is and I think will continue to be for some foreseeable time in the 
distance because right now there is no other viable source that's any competition 
to us other than the Russians 
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Pasi: Still even to this day? 
Rall: Oh yes, even today I think. Russians are demonstrating some new aircraft 
designs of their own and are going to be competitive with the F-22 which is the 
new fighter eventually aimed at replacing the F-15 airplane. 
Pasi: What do you think the greatest technological development in aerospace 
technology was over the Cold War, if you could narrow it down to one? 
Rall: I think the avionics, the micro-processors. It used to be [laughs] when I 
started in this business there were only tubes. [Laughs] That's a little 
exaggeration, but it's fairly close to the truth. And what you could do was 
severely limited in space, and weight, and cooling and the like. Now there's 
hardly any limit to what you can do; the only question you've got to answer is 
"what is it that you want to do?" I mean that's the question and how much are 
you going to do. I mean that and the digital world combined, it just opened up 
completely new arenas of expertise and capability. 
There's been other developments along the way that have been important. As a 
"tin-bender," which is what I sort of call myself, although not completely true, the 
development of "fracture mechanics" as a usable technology was extremely 
important. Fracture mechanics is the theory that every piece of metal has a flaw 
in it during the manufacturing process. The only question is not if a flaw exists; 
the question is what is the size of the flaw? How small is it? And given that a 
flaw exists, if you apply enough pressure periodically over a period of time, that 
flaw will eventually grow from fatigue and fail. And so in order to insure the 
structural integrity of physical parts, it's necessary to know what is the smallest 
flaw that can get by your inspection techniques. And for a particular kind of 
material, how fast does that flaw grow? I mean this is a major-some materials 
the flaw will grow very fast; other materials it'll grow slow. Some are affected by 
temperature, cold; some hot, and so there's a whole series of basic data that has to 
be obtained in order to get things to work. That became a highlighted item 
because we lost an F -111 wing in flight. And you could see that the wing carry­
through structure failed from fatigue. And in analysis the material was rather 
brittle compared to other options and that the inspection technique did not find the 
flaw that was in there. As a result of that, that whole F-lll fleet was put through 
cold-hangar testing. Temperature was lowered down very, very, very low, cold 
and the wings were stretched. That was a way of seeing whether or not there was 
a flaw and if it's going to cause us a problem later on in flight and turned out 
[none] of the airplanes failed that test, but it was necessary to go through and do 
it. 
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But as a result of that basic technology we instituted an aircraft structural integrity 
program which said "you have to do this kind of 'fracture analysis' on all of the 
aircraft structure. We then carried that down to the engine world. In the past all 
the engines had to do was just demonstrate that they ran it once and it worked 
good so that was adequate. And they ran it for one hundred fifty hour 
qualification test. We sat down with them and sent a guy down to West Palm 
Beach, in Florida to Pratt & Whitney and sat down with him for a year, and 
introduced him to that concept and instituted what we called an "engine structural 
integrity program, ENSIP. 
Before I left I tried to get started, and I don't know how successful it was, an 
avionics integrity program. All failures in avionics are either structural or 
chemical; there are no other kinds of failures. But the way that people always 
thought about it was that if you run it up and down the temperature scale enough 
times, that would make sure that it worked. I got some of the ideas of the 
avionics integrity program in, but I'm not sure how far it went, but at least our 
current set of avionics are a heck of a lot more reliable than what they were 
before. In fact that's a problem that sort of started with the F-lllD. The F-lllD 
was the first airplane that was intended to increase the effectiveness of the 
airplane in how it delivered its weapons. 
Mark II avionics was a big major step forward in avionics capability. And it did 
its job when it was working, but the difficulty was that it didn't work very often. 
And that sort ofled to an increased emphasis on reliability and maintainability. 
And that said that, you know, if we're going to have avionic and equipment we've 
got to make sure its working. So we spent a lot more time on both the reliability 
aspect and what you had to do to keep it running. And it had a major, major 
impact. Also increased the manning; manning is now a problem as indicated by 
the trend to want to go to unmanned vehicles. 
Pasi: Sort of human limitations for all of the avionics. 
Rail: [Laughs] That's right. 
Pasi: It does sound that the days of puttying over a hole in the fuselage with 
green gunk are far behind us. 
Rail: I think that's right. 
Pasi: What about Wright-Patterson's role in the Cold War? How would you 
estimate that role that it played? 
31 August 2007 12 
Cold War Aerospace Technology History Project Frederick T. RaZZ. Jr. 
00:38:31 

00:40:57 
00:41:12 
Rall: Well let's see. We developed the airplanes that carry our troops, carry the 
army mobility. We have the C-17, C-141, and the C-5, all of which are essential 
to mobility to get the soldiers their equipment their tanks to wherever the battle 
goes and to be ready to counter attack any incursion into Europe. I mean we have 
stacks of weapons around, but we need to get people there and equipment there in 
order to use it. 
The threats of bombers-there's always been a concern to the Russians and the B­
1 and the B-2 are prime examples of things that they have to spend their money 
on in order to defend against-In fact you can make a fairly good argument that 
the reason the Cold War, at least temporarily came to an end, some people say it's 
going to pick up again-the reason the Cold War came to an end is because we 
beat them economically rather than militarily. But the reason we beat them 
economically was because they tried to stay up with our military and they 
couldn't do it; they couldn't have the economy to back it up. That's the STAR 
WARS thing of Reagan to some extent. The placement of ground-launch cruise 
missiles in European bases, all of which were trying to be defended against and 
kept up with and Russia-the Soviet Union-couldn't support it. And I think 
that's fairly well accepted. The economic war is what we won, but we won it 
because we won the military war. 
Pasi: Mr. Rall I'd like to maybe move towards closing, but in doing that I want to 
give you the opportunity to discuss whatever you think we haven't discussed, or 
anything you would like to talk about. 
Rall: Well there's one thing which I think probably needs discussing and that is 
the military-civilian relationship at Wright Field. And that's something I felt very 
strongly about. In my view and a lot of other General Commanders that I've had, 
is that the civilians represented a basic set of knowledge, lessons learned, 
corporate memory; the civilians did. 
The way the military's organized they are required to move around and because 
of their general approach they just can't get that same kind of corporate memory 
at any place. Wright Field is a military organization; it ought to be run by 
military people. Military talk more easily to other military people than they talk 
to civilians. The civilian hierarchy-the appointees-have short-term 
perspectives therefore they're higher risk takers. The military are a little less risk 
takers and more concerned with their past history. And the civilians like us here 
at Wright Field are just sort of responsive to what the needs are and to help 
prevent mistakes that we've done before from reoccurring. 
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There was a major change in the civilian super grade status when-what used to 
be "super grades" used to be called GS-16, 17, & 18 and then there was a PL-313, 
Public Law-313, which are all high-grade kind of people-when that system was 
changed over to the Senior Executive Service. This was pushed by the high-level 
civilians in Washington. And it did several things. One is it created a title which 
went with the individual rather than with the job, so that an individual could be an 
SES no matter what job he held. You didn't have to go through all the paper 
work of changing job title in order to do it. It also gave him bonus, an 
opportunity for bonuses, 10,000 dollars, 20,000 dollars, etcetera, depending on 
how his bosses evaluated him. But it did require that they agree to mobility, that 
they agreed to be moved around much like the general officers-ofthe-are 
required to move around. You had an option when you converted, and I 
converted from a PL-313 to an SES, whether or not you wanted to convert or not. 
If you did you had to sign up to the mobility agreement. And the mobility 
agreement was sort of an academic exercise because nobody believed that they 
were going to do that. And unfortunately it turns out that they did. 
It turns out that-I and several of my people had done an independent review 
down at Eglin Air Force Base on several programs down there that were in 
trouble. And the commander down there wanted some of my people to come 
down there and work for him. He didn't ask me, he didn't ask-he just went and 
said these people are SESs and I'm going to request them. And went up through 
the chain of command, up through headquarters USAF, down to headquarters Air 
Force Systems Command, and from there a call down to our commander, General 
Bill Thurman I think it was at the time. And they all agreed that it was good thing 
to do. I mean the general officers just-I mean they are just so used to it that they 
think that that's going around. It turns out that the two people they wanted both 
worked for me, had never been talked to, had never been notified, never had 
anything. One had his son that was blind here and needed to have special 
treatment here that was only available in this local area and he didn't want to go 
and so he fought it consistently. The other one said rather than move down to 
Eglin he was going to resign and quit, and just take his thing. He went through 
the appeal process; the one with the blind son hired a lawyer and went through the 
exercise, and didn't get anywhere because you know once a general has spoken 
it's almost impossible to get them to say no. So [laughs] I did a typical Fred Rail 
kind of thing. [Laughs] I sat down with some of my guys and I said "well what do 
you think we do-what do you think if we bypass the chain of command 
completely, which is absolutely you know one of those thing you never, never, 
do; this one of those circumstances where it's probably a good thing to do." And 
they said that they agreed. So I had known the Secretary of the Air Force when 
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he had worked at McDonnel-Douglas. It was Pete Aldridge. So I said I'll put 
together in a letter to Pete Aldridge and point out to him all of the disadvantages 
of what you're going to do. Because the only thing you're going to do is you're 
going to lose one of these guys that you wanted by resignation and the other guy's 
going to accept a downgrade to GS-15 that doesn't make any sense to pursue this. 
But knowing the general officers it's not much likely to make much sense to 
them. So I put together a letter, a couple of pages, went around and met with a 
bunch of SESs, I don't know how many SESs from not only here, but from other 
bases inside the Air Force. Got them to sign it and then I send it up to 
headquarters USAF bypassing all the chain of command. And to make matters 
even better [laughs] I sent one to Pete Aldridge's personal address at home. 
Because knowing how the system works it's possible that he would never see-
Pasi: Never see it. 
Rail: -never see the letter himself. [Laughs] Needless to say boy, it really hit 
the fan. [Laughs] I was unsuccessful in getting those guys stopped. You know 
one guy was downgraded to GS-15 and the other guy did quit. But the four-star 
commander of Systems Command at that time, General Randolph, I mean he was 
fit to be tied, because his Head of Civilian Personnel, Joy Bishop, had assured 
him that this was all going to be a piece of cake, and that she had called up the 
commander down here and got it greased with General Thurman. And the only 
problem was General Thurman never talked to me or any other people. So he set 
up a meeting down here. He had some kind of excuse to come down and do 
anything and you know it's all bunch of malarkey; what he wanted to do was here 
it directly from the guy who he knew was behind it. So I got together with the 
SESs here and we put together a briefing, and I briefed him and I said "look we're 
in favor of mobility, but you've got to understand that there are some kind of 
limitations and modes of operation that you ought to go through." Well that 
didn't do any good and you know my name was mud from there on out with the 
General Officer. But I mean I-I-look myself in the mirror every morning and I 
felt good about that exercise. Joy Bishop the Head of Personnel was sent down to 
FEI, Federal Executive Institute in Virginia; she got-that's where they make cast 
offs of SESs [laughs] that they don't want in their job anymore. 
Pasi: And you fortunately were never asked to go there? [laughs] 
Rail: No, no, no, no. I was-they tried to get me more in an indirect way. 
[Laughs] I-of all my experiences and technical capability, working in electronic 
counter-measures is not my suit-but I was invited by four-star generals; in fact I 
was told to go attend meetings on Long Island for the B-1 electronic-ALQ-161 
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Electronic Counter-Measure Set. I forget who it was, Lora!? I forget who had the 
contract; I think it's Lora!. And I got asked to do that over about three or four 
times over a period of times. And that was-that ECM set was-a real problem 
on the B-1; I mean it just wasn't performing. So after they had had me up there 
you know just sitting around in meetings sitting on my thumbs, I got a call one 
day saying they wanted-the Scientific Advisory Board wanted-me to come up 
and talk to them about the ALQ-161. Unique Scientific Advisory Board in that it 
was headed up by General Leaf, and one other general and I don't know-zero 
civilians on the panel and that's never happened before on the Scientific Advisory 
Board. 
One of our friends up there, a captain, called up one of my guys, and told me 
about what was going on and it turns out that they had asked all of the people who 
knew about the ALQ-161 to come in and brief and I was going to be the last one 
there. And it was clear to the guy up in the Pentagon who was doing the 
secretarial work for this particular SAB meeting was that this was a sort of a 
hatchet job going. And this is how I was going to get relie[ved] from duty 
because I was technically incapable. So I got the guys together, and I worked 
with them for three days and put together a briefing, a factual briefing, [laughs] a 
historical briefing, [laughs] which started back when the review committees up in 
the Pentagon said they didn't have enough money for this development of the 
ALQ-161 and that they needed to increase the funds, that the funds weren't 
increased. And another committee went through and said "you've got to go back 
and double the amount of money available," and it wasn't made available, but 
we're going to do this demonstration test and it really wasn't a demonstration test. 
And they fired the Chief Engineer on the B-1 program, Austin Sea, because he 
kept telling the General in charge of the B-1 program that they were going down 
the same road that the B-70 had gone down and so they fired him and for the first 
time ever brought in a civilian outside guy from General Dynamics to become 
Chief Engineer on the B-1, absolutely unheard of. And it went on and on and on 
and to make a long story short, [laughs] it was really a condemning story on how 
bad the management on this program was and how well that engineering stood up 
trying to get its word out. And so when I went up to give the briefing, [laughs] I 
started out the briefing-! said, "I only brought two copies of this briefing with 
me because I don't think you want this spread around the Washington area 
[laughs]. I never heard a word after that. They dropped the whole thing. As far 
as I know there was never a report of the SAB published [laughs] and the whole 
thing just went away. 
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00:54:51 Pasi: It sounds like then the success of Wright-Patterson during the Cold War 
was made possible by this mix of military and civilian personnel. 
00:55:00 Rall: Oh absolutely, it's a good thing to have a mix; it absolutely is. And there 
were civilians, and I wasn't one of the ones that agreed with this, that thought that 
they ought to be the chiefs. I said that that's fundamentally wrong because I mean 
this is a military organization; you want the chiefs to be military and you want the 
civilians there helping them and keeping them out of trouble, and even getting 
them promoted. 
But you don't-! mean there's no glory in being up there in the first seat when 
you can be the power behind the throne. I mean that's a much better place to be 
than it is up there where you have to go through all the protocol requirements; you 
have to go through the shaking hands here and dinners there. And if you're 
number two, you show up that's good, if you don't that's also good. It's much 
nicer and it's much more powerful. 
I forget how many Colonels I had as head of EN in the years that I was there, it's 
probably close to eight to ten. Some of them were really great guys; one-I had a 
collection of models on my shelf and I still do as a matter of fact, one of which 
was an F-105 model, a big metal model given to me by the contractor. And this 
particular Colonel had flown F-lOSs over in Vietnam and he had envied me that 
model his whole time he was my boss. Excuse me. And one of the things that 
really made me feel good was when he retired and I gave him a retirement gift, I 
gave him that F-105; he was so happy I think he almost cried. [Laughs] And you 
know there are some people, some Colonels that I wouldn't have given-well I 
won't-I'llleave it unsaid. 
00:57:21 Pasi: Why don't we maybe stop right there then. 
00:57:23 Rall: Yeah. That's fine 
00:57:24 Pasi: Mr Rall, thank you for devoting as much time as you did to us, or for us 
today. Appreciate you being here. 
00:57:31 Rall: Happy to do it. 
0057:33 Pasi: And thank you very much. 
00:57:34 Rall: Right. 
End of Video Tape 3 
End oflnterview 
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